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This report looks at trends in conflict and instability in the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on 
climate change effects and a number of civil liberties. The Indo-Pacific region is both highly 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change and already facing significant security risks and 
challenges, many of which will be exacerbated by the impact of climate change. There are 
notable increases in resource-based conflicts, migration-induced violence and armed 
insurgencies. The countries reviewed all show worrying trends in terms of erosion of 
freedom of expression, media freedom, freedom of belief and civil society freedom. The 
situation in Bangladesh and India is particularly serious and is already fuelling violence and 
conflict.   
This EIR largely draws on grey literature, as well as media articles, blogs and other such 
sources. Given the wide range of issues and countries covered in this report (see below), it 
should be considered as a ‘broad brush’ review – it does not go into each issue in-depth. 
The available evidence was sufficient for this purpose. Evidence on climate change effects 
was particularly strong. However, the literature was gender-blind to a considerable extent.    
The two themes on which the EIR focuses are (i) climate change and (ii) guarding civil space 
and including all voices. While there is a general consensus in the literature that there is not 
a direct causal link between climate change effects and conflict, the former can, in 
conjunction with other factors, lead to/exacerbate conflict risks. Guarding civic space and 
including all voices encompasses a broad range of issues. This EIR looks at freedom of 
expression, media freedom, freedom of belief, civil society freedom and treatment of under-
represented groups. Trends indicating that these freedoms are being undermined could fuel 
conflict risk. Indeed, in many of the countries reviewed, the erosion of these rights is already 
leading to violence and conflict.    
The EIR examines the above two themes in five Indo-Pacific countries: Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. These were chosen to give a broad range of 
situations and challenges/risks from the region. Note that this EIR is confined to an 
assessment of conflict risks and does not examine measures being taken by government or 
others to address these. 
Key findings are given below for each country:  
Bangladesh 
Climate change and conflict: Located in a low-lying delta, Bangladesh is one of the 
countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, including river and coastal 
flooding and erosion, rising sea levels and more frequent, more intense severe weather 
events. These are leading to (amongst other effects) reduced crop yields, increased food 
insecurity, diminished water resources, biodiversity loss and loss of livelihoods. Climate 
change impacts could: contribute to environmental migration and resource-based conflicts; 
exacerbate driving factors for violent extremism and anti-Hindu violence; generate 
emigration to neighbouring Indian states leading to interethnic and communal conflict there; 
and rekindle armed insurgency among indigenous communities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 
The continued influx of huge numbers of Rohingya refugees into the Cox’s Bazar region of 
Bangladesh is already and will continue to accelerate environmental degradation there and 
could lead to ethnic conflict. 
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Guarding civic space and including all voices: There are serious restrictions on freedom 
of expression and the media, in particular with regards to criticism of the Government. 
Moves such as arrests, physical assault and forcible disappearances have led to a high 
degree of self-censorship. Since 2011 Islam is the state religion in Bangladesh and 
minorities’ freedom of religion has been eroded. Violent extremism is on the rise, with 
numerous (often brutal) attacks, particularly on secularists. The Government response has 
been inadequate, failing to provide protection or justice. Civil society groups (especially 
human rights groups) have been hit by many of the same restrictions affecting the media, 
notably through control of foreign funding. Ethnic and religious minorities, and the LGBT+ 
community, face some discrimination in law, as well as societal discrimination and 
harassment.  
India 
Climate change: India faces numerous climate-related hazards and is predicted to 
experience increased flooding from sea-level rise and extreme precipitation events, as well 
as increased severity of drought and heatwaves. These effects are causing degradation of 
agricultural lands, increased water stress, rising mortality and morbidity, and loss of 
biodiversity and livelihoods, with rural areas particularly negatively impacted. Climate change 
impacts could: contribute to resource-based conflicts and increased urban violence, 
including between religious and ethnic communities; contribute to the immigration of 
Bangladeshis into north-eastern states and Assam, igniting/reviving separatist movements; 
deepen local alienation and resentment towards the Indian government in Kashmir, and 
exacerbate insurgent and/or extremist violence in the state; accentuate interstate disputes 
over river water sharing, and exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan over sharing 
of Indus River system waters, and between India and China over dam construction.   
Guarding civic space and including all voices: India has seen a marked erosion in 
freedom of expression and media freedom, through a combination of legislative provisions, 
government actions (e.g., arrests) and harassment by Hindu nationalist groups. These have 
led to a high degree of self-censorship on the part of the media. While officially a secular 
democracy, the rise of Hindu nationalism - particularly since the 2014 election of Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi - has prompted many attacks on religious minorities, notably over 
cow slaughter and religious conversion. The Government has not only failed to protect those 
targeted, but fostered an environment in which hate speech and violence against minorities 
(especially Muslims) flourishes. Civil society groups, especially rights groups, are targeted by 
the Government, notably through restrictions on foreign funding and (mis)use of 
counterterrorism legislation. The position of Scheduled Castes (Dalits) and Scheduled Tribes 
in India remains difficult, with many facing discrimination and violence. Muslims have been 
most marginalised under the Modi government: in Assam, nearly two million Muslims were 
effectively rendered stateless, while the special autonomy of Indian-Administered Kashmir 
was revoked amid a massive security crackdown in the state. 
Indonesia 
Climate change: Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic state, the world’s fourth most 
populous country, and is highly vulnerable to sea-level rise as well as other climate change-
related disasters including forest and land fires, landslides, storms, and drought. Climate 
change impacts include reduced agricultural productivity and increased food insecurity, 
increased water stress, erosion of coastlines, increased forest fires, and biodiversity loss – 
all leading to loss of livelihoods. Jakarta, one of the most densely populated cities in the 
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world, is especially vulnerable. The only current armed challenges to the authority of the 
state in Indonesia come from a low-level separatist movement in Papua, and sporadic 
attacks from radical Islamist militants. There is also low-level local violence over resources 
and community rights. Climate change effects – with loss of land and displaced people – can 
be expected to intensify local clashes. Similarly, in-migration and exploitation of local 
resources by outsiders could fuel the Papua insurgency. In the context of climate change 
and conflict, it is worth noting that illegal logging and deforestation – rife in Indonesia – 
contributes to both.  
Guarding civic space and including all voices: Various laws against blasphemy, 
defamation, and certain other forms of speech are used to inhibit freedom of expression in 
Indonesia, particularly on sensitive topics such as criticism of the Government and the 
President. Media freedom is similarly hampered through legal and regulatory restrictions. 
Journalists covering sensitive subjects face harassment, threats and even physical assault 
and violence. Indonesia is overwhelmingly Muslim-majority, and religious minorities face 
restrictions (e.g., in setting up places of worship), discrimination and even violence, with the 
Government failing to protect them. Anti-blasphemy laws are another tool to target 
minorities, and use of these is growing. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are subject 
to government monitoring and interference. Marginalised ethnic groups include Papuans 
and, to a lesser extent, ethnic Chinese. LGBT+ people also suffer from widespread 
discrimination.  
The Philippines 
Climate change: The Philippines is comprised of over 7,000 islands, many low-lying and 
lacking natural barriers to the sea, and is in the world’s most cyclone-prone region – some of 
the factors making it highly vulnerable to climate change effects such as sea-level rise. The 
impacts of these include crop loss/failure, rising food prices and food imports, water 
shortages, damage to coastal ecosystems and loss of livelihoods, and widespread 
infrastructure damage. The urban poor are especially vulnerable. The Philippines has two 
long-running insurgencies – by a number of Moro nationalist/separatist groups and by the 
communist New People’s Army – as well as Islamist violent extremism. Climate change 
effects can be expected to exacerbate conflict. For example, drought and reduced 
agricultural productivity in Mindanao is leading to food insecurity and increased poverty, 
which is likely to exacerbate anti-government sentiment in the area, and drive support for 
separatist/violent extremist groups, especially among youth.  
Guarding civic space and including all voices: The Philippines has been described as 
one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists, and President Duterte’s hostile 
rhetoric toward the media exacerbates this. His government has been overt in its 
suppression of the media. Journalists have been attacked, and 15 murdered under his 
administration, but the authorities make little effort to find those responsible or to protect 
journalists. The Government has also taken steps to curb civil society freedom, targeting 
both individual activists and organisations. Environmental and land rights activists are at 
particular risk, as well as critics of the President and government. The Philippines is a 
strongly Catholic country and, while there are no major issues with freedom of belief, LGBT+ 






Climate change: Thailand sits in the Mekong Delta plain and is ranked 8th in the Global 
Climate Risk Index for long-term risk. Among the main climate change effects in the country 
are flooding, sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion and droughts. These will have a devastating 
impact on Thailand’s tourism sector, which accounts for 12% of its GDP, as well as 
agriculture (accounting for around 50% of employment and 10% of GDP) and trade, while 
millions will be displaced. Climate change effects have also damaged ecosystems and 
livelihoods that depend on them. Thailand’s capital city, Bangkok, is especially vulnerable. 
Thailand has been facing a hot-cold armed insurgency for many decades in southern 
provinces which have large Malay Muslim populations. The rise of ‘extremist’ Buddhism in 
the country is a factor. The literature does not refer to climate change effects influencing or 
exacerbating these specific conflicts/tensions, but it does assert that deteriorating 
environmental conditions could exacerbate existing social issues such as political unrest, 
poor economic conditions, food insecurity, inequality and poverty, and cause widespread 
destruction of livelihoods. These, in turn, could trigger clashes between different 
communities and wider conflict.  
Guarding civic space and including all voices: There are significant restrictions on 
freedom of expression in Thailand despite the country’s transition from military to semi-
civilian rule in July 2019. Various laws are used to target, among others, opposition 
politicians, academics, and activists. Two further significant restrictions on freedom of 
expression in Thailand are in relation to the monarch, and to Buddhism, both of which are 
punishable by law. Media freedom is curbed in Thailand using many of the same legal 
instruments. Civil society groups focused on defending human rights and freedom of 
expression, and promoting democracy, continue to face restrictions, criminalisation and 
prosecution by the state. As in the Philippines, land rights and environmental activists risk 
serious and even deadly violence in Thailand. There is widespread discrimination against 
LGBT+ people, by families and society, employers, and the authorities. Also marginalised in 
Thailand are indigenous hill communities in the north of the country, with many lacking 
formal citizenship, which renders them ineligible to vote, own land, attend state schools, or 
receive protection under labour laws.  
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Themes in relation to conflict and stability 
Climate change  
Links between climate change effects and conflict 
There is scientific consensus that climate change is real and is happening. According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) the warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal (van Baalen & Mobjork, 2018: 1). However, on whether this is leading to violent 
conflict, the consensus in the literature is that there is not a direct causal link between 
climate change and conflict. Conflict situations and drivers of conflict are highly complex: 
‘Sequences of events leading to outbreaks of violence are always multifactorial and complex 
and it is usually not possible to identify single triggering factors’ (Sida, 2018: 24). This is 
echoed in a very recent evidence review on climate change, conflict and fragility: ‘The 
emerging consensus is that climatic factors can be just one of many drivers of conflict. 
Others are generally present, including very low economic development and social and 
political instability’ (Peters et al, 2020: 7).  
However, there could be indirect links as climate change effects exacerbate conflict risks: 
‘Climate change may exacerbate existing or create new socioeconomic stresses such as 
loss of arable land, resource scarcities, forced migration and weakening institutions, all of 
which could make a violent escalation of inter- and intrastate conflicts more likely’ (Huntjens 
& Nachbar, 2015: 13). There are several mechanisms by which climate change effects could 
lead to/exacerbate conflict risks (Sida, 2018; Froese & Schilling, 2019): 
▪ Diminished access to resources and increased competition over resources – as 
climate change causes a reduction in the availability of water, or usable land, 
pressure on natural resources increases and competition could lead to instability and 
conflict. 
▪ Food insecurity – as food production is reduced and food prices increase, this could 
lead to social unrest and conflict. 
▪ Extreme weather events causing economic shocks and livelihood insecurity – more 
frequent/severe storms, floods, drought, longer periods of extreme heat, etc. will 
cause destruction of physical infrastructure and assets and loss of livelihoods, with 
knock-on effects that could lead to conflict. 
▪ Environmental migration – one effect could be large-scale displacement of people1 
(e.g., from rural to urban areas, global south to global north), which places added 
strain on destination areas (on services, competition for natural resources) and could 
potentially destabilise them (e.g., conflict between migrant pastoralists and local 
farmers over land use). 
▪ Sea-level rise and coastal degradation – again, one likely effect of this would be 
migration to inland/higher regions, potentially causing tension and conflict there. 
▪ Reduced economic growth undermines government capacity – higher 
unemployment, higher taxes, reduced government revenue, increased oil prices and 
other effects indirectly caused by climate change could weaken governments’ ability 
to provide services and create jobs, potentially creating conditions for extremism, 
crime and/or social breakdown. 
 
1 Similarly, although a direct causal relationship between climate change and migration is not generally supported 
in the literature, there is growing recognition of climate change as a contributing and exacerbating factor in 
migration. 
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▪ Increased recruitment to armed groups – loss of economic opportunities and 
livelihoods because of climate change effects could drive desperate people into the 
hands of armed groups. 
▪ Unintended effects of climate policies – E.g., when local communities are denied 
access to forests as part of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation) initiatives; local opposition to wind parks because these require 
land and on aesthetic grounds. 
Climate change effects in the Indo-Pacific 
The Indo-Pacific region is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and climate 
change-driven hazards including extreme weather (rain and heat) events such as cyclones, 
floods and droughts; sea-level rise; and acidifying oceans (IMCCS, 2020). Southeast Asia 
has, for example, one of the longest coastlines in the world, leaving it highly exposed to 
extreme weather events and sea-level rise which would affect major coastal cities such as 
Jakarta, Manila, Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City (Nordqvist & Krampe, 2018). From 1970-
2018, approximately 1.1 million people were killed in storms, floods and other disasters 
(excluding earthquakes/tsunamis) in the Indo-Asia Pacific, and people in the region are five 
times more likely to be affected by natural disasters than those elsewhere (IMCCS, 2020: 7). 
Almost half of the 281 natural disaster events that occurred in 2018 were in the Asia-Pacific 
region, including eight out of the ten deadliest (IMCCS, 2020: 7).  
These effects of climate change are taking place in a context of already significant security 
risks and challenges: growing geostrategic competition such as maritime boundary disputes 
and military build-up in contested zones of the South China Sea, expanding military 
capabilities across many countries; ongoing conflicts related to separatist movements and 
transnational violent extremist organisations, as well as piracy and serious organised crime 
(IMCCS, 2020). The International Military Council on Climate Change and Security (IMCCS) 
(2020: 5) warns that in the Indo-Asia Pacific adverse climate change impacts ‘can seriously 
complicate these existing security vulnerabilities – eroding coping capacities, increasing 
grievances and worsening underlying tensions and fragilities’. Fetzek and McGinn (2020) 
stress the need to consider climate security consequences ‘with a broad aperture, including 
how they affect current and future drivers of fragility and instability’, and to coordinate 
comprehensive responses and shift to a more preventive posture.  
Guarding civic space and including all voices  
The above – ‘guarding civic space’ and ‘including all voices’ – are broad terms used by the 
Open Government Partnership (OGP). While the full range of issues under these can be 
very wide, this EIR focuses on freedom of expression media freedom, freedom of belief, civil 
society freedom, and treatment of under-represented groups. Other issues such as political 
liberties and gender equality, which could have fallen under the term, are not considered in 
this EIR because of time and space constraints.  
This review looks at how these issues are handled in the five countries under consideration, 
to what extent rights to freedom of speech, etc. are respected, and the ways in which these 
are fuelling/exacerbating violence and conflict. Given the scope of issues (rights) being 
considered in the five countries, the review does not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of each issue in each country, but rather focuses on the most significant 
developments in terms of stability and conflict.   
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While the EIR makes connections between climate change effects/impact and conflict risk in 
each country, for the theme of ‘guarding civic space and including all voices’ it only 
describes the situation and challenges – the way in which these developments are already 
directly/indirectly contributing to violence and conflict, or have the potential to do so, is 
implicit in those descriptions. 
Bangladesh 
Climate change  
Climate change effects 
Bangladesh is located in a low-lying delta (two-thirds of the country sits less than 5m above 
sea level [USAID, 2018: 2]) which serves as the drain for several major river systems – the 
Brahmaputra, Ganges and Meghna, as well as Himalayan glacial melt and the area’s annual 
monsoon rains (Newman, 2014). These factors contribute to make it one of the most 
vulnerable countries in the world to the effects of climate change: it ranks seventh on the 
Global Climate Risk Index 2020 (IMCCS, 2020: 32). In Bangladesh, climate change is 
leading to rising temperatures, river and coastal flooding and erosion, rising sea levels, 
increasing levels of salinity, and more frequent, more intense severe weather events (BIISS 
& Saferworld, 2009: 7). Bangladesh is hit by a tropical cyclone, on average, once every three 
years (USAID, 2018: 1). Its situation is made worse by the fact that it is the world’s eighth-
most populous country with a population of over 165 million, and already has high levels of 
poverty – one in three people live in poverty (USAID, 2018: 1).  
Key climate change impacts in Bangladesh include (USAID, 2018: 1-3):  
▪ Agriculture and food security – reduced crop yields, fisheries and livestock losses, 
and increased food insecurity. The impacts of climate change are expected to 
decrease agricultural GDP by 3.1% each year, which equates to an overall loss in 
added value of USD 36 billion between 2005 and 2050. Rice production – a key 
source of nutrition – is expected to drop by 8% by 2050. 
▪ Water resources – decreased potable water supplies, changes to river flows and 
decreased irrigation water. Extreme climate events such as flooding, drought, sea-
level rise, and cyclones are likely to significantly impact the functionality and 
accessibility of water supply and sanitation infrastructure. Millions living in the 
country’s vast floodplains, coastal areas and delta will be affected. 
▪ Health – increased health stress, higher prevalence of infectious diseases (including 
cholera, diarrhoea, malaria and dengue), injury and death from cyclones and floods. 
Healthcare service delivery will also be negatively affected. 
▪ Ecosystems – biodiversity loss, loss of livelihoods and reduced natural flood 
protection. Natural resources provide livelihoods for over 75% of Bangladeshis, so 
ecosystems are critical. The Sundarbans, the largest continuous mangrove forest in 
the world (and a large source of carbon sequestration), could be inundated by a 
potential 45cm rise in sea level by 2050, reducing biodiversity and removing an 
important source of natural protection against high strong storm and cyclone winds, 
as well as storm surges and coastal flooding.  
▪ Energy – increased demand for energy, damaged energy infrastructure and 
decreased hydropower capability. The combination of these is likely to lead to higher 
energy prices, affecting access for the poor. 
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More than 5 million Bangladeshis live in areas that are very vulnerable to cyclones and 
storm surges and every year, between 30% and 70% of the country is flooded, placing 
pressure on land availability, agriculture, and water security and straining development 
(Blondel, 2012: 42). 
Dhaka, the capital and only megacity in the country, will continue to be acutely affected by 
climate change (IMCCS, 2020: 32). It is exposed to excessive rainfall, flooding, cyclones, 
and heat and cold waves. These environmental stressors combine with non-climatic factors 
such as extreme population density, poverty, rural-to-urban migration, uncoordinated 
urbanisation and lack of basic public services to increase exposure and vulnerability 
(IMCCS, 2020: 32-33). Dhaka has already experienced a population explosion due to 
migration, much of it due to environmental factors, swelling from 4 million to 15 million within 
a few years – the city is forecast to hold an additional 25 million people by 2050 (Newman, 
2014). Dhaka is ranked the second least liveable city in the world for its severe overcrowding 
– ‘migrants far outstrip the city’s ability to accommodate them’ (Newman, 2014). 
Exacerbation of existing tensions/conflicts  
Bangladesh faces a number of significant security challenges, including long-standing 
hostility between the two main political parties leading to political violence, a rise in violent 
extremism, and the Rohingya refugee crisis (Herbert, 2019a). Climate change effects could 
fuel these, as well as localised clashes over land and other resources.  
Resource-based conflicts: In 2009, a study based on extensive fieldwork in both source 
areas of environmental migration (those particularly vulnerable to climate change) and 
destination areas (for migrants leaving those source areas) in Bangladesh, looked at how 
climate change and security issues are interlinked. In source areas, it found that climate 
change effects were driving increased tension, crime and violence as livelihoods broke down 
and competition for resources intensified (BIISS & Saferworld, 2009: ii). Climate change-
influenced security issues in source areas included: tension over land, with increased 
competition for access to and control of land for farming; tension over property, as thefts 
(e.g., of cattle, household goods) increased in the wake of natural disasters such as floods; 
tension over water resources; and increased female insecurity and sexual violence. In 
destination areas, the study identified three main triggers of conflict (BIISS & Saferworld, 
2009: iii): 
▪ Disputes over land – High levels of physical insecurity and conflict were reported in 
destination areas as a result of competition for land. There is particularly fierce 
competition for government-owned khas land2, which has led to violence in some 
cases. In one area, local gangs were restricting access to land and demanding 
money for rent. There have also been clashes in response to attempts by vested 
interests and landowners to grab land and/or forcibly evict migrants.  
▪ Competition for employment – Migrants add to the labour pool, increasing 
competition for jobs. Migrants face a double insecurity: not only is it hard for them to 
find employment, but they also face reprisals from existing residents who blame them 
for unemployment and falling wages. This has led to migrants being harassed and 
attacked by local people. 
 
2 Khas land refers to state land which is ‘free’ and available for distribution to the landless (BIIS & Saferworld, 
2009: 19). 
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▪ Competition for access to water – As in source areas, there is increasing competition 
for water. This leads to clashes between groups and forces many people to travel 
long distances to find water. 
Violent extremism: The rise in violent extremism in Bangladesh, particularly since 2013, is 
driven by several factors, including the long-standing rivalry between the Awami League (AL) 
party and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), weak governance, rising conservatism 
within Bangladeshi society and regional/international influences (Herbert, 2019a). Also 
significant are socioeconomic factors: a young population with high rates of youth 
unemployment, high levels of poverty and inequality (despite sustained economic growth in 
recent years) and rapid urbanisation (as noted above) (Herbert, 2019a). All these factors are 
likely to be exacerbated by the effects of climate change – in turn, potentially fuelling violent 
extremism in the country. 
Anti-Hindu violence: Climate change effects are already leading to increased targeting of the 
country’s minority Hindu population. Bangladeshi Hindus were targeted in a two-month-long 
spate of attacks between December 2013 and February 2014. While the immediate causes 
were anger by Islamic extremists over a contested election and war crimes tribunal, poverty 
and resource scarcity were major factors – victims noted that some attackers were mostly 
interested in grabbing Hindu land and property (Newman, 2014). Such incidents are likely to 
increase under the ongoing negative impacts of climate change. One army officer deployed 
to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide warned: ‘I can see a similarity about potential threats in 
Bangladesh like Rwanda…there is an ominous sign of potential outbursts anytime’ (cited in 
Newman, 2014).  
India: Climate change effects could fuel emigration motivated by a quest for arable farmland 
and livelihoods across the border into India, specifically into West Bengal, Tripura and 
Assam states (Newman, 2014). Large-scale immigration sparked interethnic conflict in 
Assam in the early 1980s; in 1983, Assamese militants massacred several thousand 
Bengalis in a single day, and there was more bloodshed in 2012 (Newman, 2014). India has 
responded to migration issues with Bangladesh by erecting a barbed-wire fence along their 
shared border, with the stated goal of keeping out Islamic militants, illegal smuggling, and 
trafficking (Blondel, 2012: 42). However, the fence itself has become a source of tension with 
suspicions, fears and accusations from both sides and reports of several hundred people 
killed by border security guards (Blondel, 2012: 43; Herbert, 2019a: 20). At the same time, 
the Indian government has passed a law allowing Bangladeshi Hindus – but not Muslims – 
to migrate to India (see India below). This increases the chances of clashes along ethnic 
lines between locals and migrants in Indian states bordering Bangladesh, and fuels 
intercommunal tension in both countries. 
Chittagong Hill Tracts: The increase in extreme weather events in coastal regions could also 
lead to increased migration to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region of the country. The 
CHT region has already seen conflict between indigenous communities in the area and 
Bengali settlers, relocated there by the Bangladesh government between 1979 and 1985 
(Blondel, 2012: 42; Herbert, 2019a: 19). Local anger at the settlement of Bengalis led to calls 
for autonomy and armed insurgency; while the CHT Peace Accord in 1997 ended this, 
settlers and the Government are accused of not honouring their commitments (Blondel, 
2012; Herbert, 2019a). The influx of climate refugees could reignite conflict in the region. 
Rohingya crisis: Since 2016-17 Bangladesh has seen large numbers of Rohingya Muslims 
enter the country, fleeing violence in neighbouring Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Most are 
concentrated in the Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh, in the south of the country. As of 
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January 2019, over 900,000 Rohingya refugees were residing in Ukhiya and Teknaf 
Upazilas of Cox’s Bazar, most in 34 refugee camps (SEG, 2019: 10, cited in Idris, 2019: 3). 
The protracted presence of such large numbers of Rohingya refugees – chances of 
repatriation would appear to be negligible – places massive strain on local services, jobs and 
natural resources. ‘The high number and prolonged residence of refugees increases the rate 
at which land and resources are used up, a process which accelerates environmental 
degradation and in turn leads to greater competition between natives and refugees for 
scarce land and resources’ (Rahman, 2010: 237, as cited in Idris, 2017: 5). The Cox’s Bazar 
region of Bangladesh is one of the poorest in the country, and traditional tourism revenue is 
being negatively impacted by the refugee influx (Cookson, 2017b, as cited in Idris, 2017: 5). 
There are already signs that the initial welcome extended to Rohingyas by Bangladeshis is 
dwindling, and tensions with the host community are growing. Malley (2018, as cited in 
Herbert, 2019a: 16) warns that the refugees’ presence could play into communal conflict or 
aggravate political divisions, especially around elections.  
Guarding civic space and including all voices  
Freedom of expression and media freedom 
Despite constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, the Bangladesh authorities have 
imposed serious restrictions on this in order to suppress any criticism of the Government, as 
well as to limit religious freedom (see below). Various provisions, including under the Penal 
Code, have been used to target activists, writers, bloggers and journalists critical of the 
Government. Since 2013, hundreds of people – mostly opposition activists or critics of the 
Government and state agencies – have been ‘forcibly disappeared’ or have died in detention 
(Humanists International, 2020a: 5). This ‘leads to self-censorship on some religious and 
political topics’ (Humanists International, 2020a: 1). 
There are considerable curbs on media freedom in Bangladesh. In October 2018, the Digital 
Security Act (DSA) was passed, which includes harsh provisions (e.g., allowing searches 
and arrests without warrant, criminalising various forms of speech) and has been used to 
penalise criticism of the Government (HRW, 2020a). According to the Bangladesh Editors’ 
Council, the DSA effectively prohibits investigative journalism (HRW, 2020a). Journalists and 
media outlets face many forms of pressure: frequent lawsuits, harassment, closure of media 
agencies, arrest, and serious or deadly physical attacks (Freedom House, 2020a). 
Numerous journalists were arrested in the run-up to the December 2018 national elections, 
and this has continued in their aftermath. During the campaign, reporters in the field were 
also targeted by political activists (notably supporters of the ruling Awami League party, and 
its student wing, the Chhatra League) (RSF, 2020a). According to Freedom House (2020a), 
‘a climate of impunity for attacks on media workers remains the norm’. Reporters Without 
Borders (RSF, 2020a) note that:  
As a result, self-censorship has reached unprecedented levels because editors are 
reluctant to risk imprisonment or their media outlet’s closure. Radical Islamist 
militants meanwhile harass and even murder journalists and bloggers who dare to 
defend an overly secular vision of society.  
Bangladesh’s ranking in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index was 151 (out of 180 
countries), one place down from its 2019 ranking (RSF, 2020a).  
There have been numerous arrests of journalists during the COVID-19 pandemic, as the 
Government tries to suppress criticism of its response to the crisis. As of May 2020, 16 
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journalists had been arrested since the start of the pandemic (Article 19, 2020). Moreover, 
there have also been restrictions on public dissent: medical professionals have been told not 
to talk to the media; the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) (an elite police unit) are monitoring 
social media and, by 10 April, had reportedly arrested ten people for spreading false 
information, and in May a circular was issued prohibiting all government employees from 
liking, sharing or commenting on social media posts critical of the Bangladeshi government 
(Article 19, 2020). Article 19 (2020) note that the crackdown on freedom of expression during 
the pandemic ‘fits a wider pattern of serious restrictions on critical voices in Bangladesh, 
where there are currently dozens of journalists, bloggers and activists in prison for simply 
expressing their opinion’. 
Internet censorship in Bangladesh has increased. Nearly 20,000 websites were blocked by 
the Government in February 2019 in what was described as an ‘anti-pornography’ sweep but 
included several popular blogging sites. In March 2019, access to Al-Jazeera’s website was 
blocked following a report by the news agency citing allegations against the Prime Minister’s 
security advisor (HRW, 2020a).  
Freedom of belief 
Despite Article 8 of the Constitution noting secularism as one of the four fundamental 
principles of the state, an amendment to the Constitution passed in 2011 established Islam 
as the state religion, while allowing equal status and equal right in the practice of other 
religions. However, according to the United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom (USCIRF), ‘(a)midst the Bangladesh government’s broader crackdown on civil 
rights, freedom of religion or belief continues to be impacted, especially for the countries’ 
religious minorities – including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians and Ahmedi Muslims’ (cited in 
Humanists International, 2020a: 1). 
In recent years Bangladesh has seen a rise in violent religious extremism, targeted at 
secularists and religious minorities. Since January 2015, at least 40 individuals were 
murdered in such attacks, including secular writers, bloggers and publishers, and a Hindu 
priest (CEP, 2020: 8). The International Crisis Group notes that the attacks ‘symbolise a new 
kind of extremist threat, aimed at silencing liberal and secular voices’ (ICG, 2016: 7). The 
brutal way in which these killings were carried out, often using machetes, heightens the 
sense of fear they generate. In July 2016, there was a marked escalation in extremist 
violence with an assault on the Holey Bakery in Gulshan, Dhaka, in which Muslims and local 
Bangladeshi hostages were separated from non-Muslims and foreigners: 20 of the latter 
were killed (CEP, 2020: 1). 
The authorities have failed to provide adequate protection to secular writers or to bring those 
responsible for the killings to justice. Indeed, ‘the Government has frequently given in to 
pressure from Islamist parties, and continues to threaten atheists and others on charges of 
“hurting religious sentiments”’ (Humanists International 2020a: 1). All of this is ‘feeding a 
climate of fear and self-censorship’ (Humanists International, 2020a: 3). Many secular 
writers are in hiding or have left Bangladesh to ensure their safety.  
Communal violence is a growing problem in Bangladesh. Several Shia mosques and Ashura 
processions were attacked at the end of 2015. At least 101 people were reported to have 
been injured in violence against religious minorities in the first ten months of 2019; at least 
65 temples, monasteries or statues were attacked, and 53 homes of religious minorities 
were attacked and set on fire (Humanists International, 2020a: 4). There have been a 
number of incidents in recent years in which violence against religious or other minorities 
appears to have been deliberately provoked using social media. In October 2019, for 
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example, a Muslim mob attacked Hindu homes in Barisal after rumours circulated that a 
Hindu man posted blasphemous content on Facebook. Police later reported that the man’s 
account had been hacked, but four people were shot and killed by police in response to the 
violence (Freedom House, 2020a). 
Civil society freedom and under-represented groups  
Civil society groups have been hit by similar restrictions to those affecting media 
organisations, and undermining freedom of expression and assembly. One mechanism for 
this is that the use of foreign funds must be cleared by the NGO Affairs Bureau, which can 
also approve or reject individual projects (Freedom House, 2020a). The 2016 Foreign 
Donations (Voluntary) Activities Regulation Act made it more difficult for NGOs to obtain 
foreign funds and gave officials broad authority to deregister NGOs.  
Human rights groups have been especially targeted: ‘Democracy, governance and human 
rights NGOs are regularly denied permission for proposed projects and are subject to 
harassment and surveillance’ (Freedom House, 2020a). One prominent human rights NGO, 
Odhikar, had its foreign funds frozen, and its secretary was put on trial for contradicting the 
official number of casualties during a 2013 Islamist rally (ICG, 2016: 21). In 2019, the 
Government released a draft ‘social welfare’ law which would increase NGOs’ reporting 
requirements and give the authorities broad powers to ‘shutter groups they decide are not 
acting in the “public interest”’ (Freedom House, 2020a). According to one analyst, the end 
result is that ‘CSOs in Bangladesh are in a state of confusion: barring a handful, most stay 
silent regarding the widespread human rights abuses and choose to play safe on the 
multiple governance and rights deficits to avoid the wrath of the almighty authorities’ (Alum, 
2018). 
Marginalised groups in Bangladesh include religious and ethnic minorities, as well as LGBT+ 
people. Ethnic and religious minorities face some discrimination under law as well as 
harassment and violation of their rights in practice. ‘Indigenous people in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (CHT), religious minorities and other ethnic groups remain subject to physical attacks, 
property destruction, land grabs by Bengali settlers, and occasional abuses by security 
forces’ (Freedom House, 2020a). Over 20 years after the CHT Peace Accord, the region 
remains under military occupation and indigenous rights activists face threats of arrest, 
enforced disappearance and violence. In April 2020, Michael Chakma, an indigenous rights 
activist, disappeared on his way to Dhaka. Despite a request in May from the High Court to 
the Home Ministry for a report on progress into the investigation of his disappearance, none 
has been provided (HRW, 2020a). 
The LGBT+ community in Bangladesh faces hostility from wider society, as well as targeted 
attacks by extremists and harassment by the authorities. There is a criminal ban on same-
sex sexual acts. This is rarely enforced, but societal discrimination remains the norm and 
dozens of attacks on LBGT+ individuals are reported every year (Freedom House, 2020a). 
Seeking protection from the police is often not an option. As one LGBT+ campaigner 
explained: ‘Police will beat you because you are gay. So why would you go to the police? It’s 
a problem – we cannot approach the police with our problems’ (Amnesty International, 2017: 
24). After the 2016 murder of prominent LGBT+ activist Xulhaz Mannan, a number of LGBT+ 
individuals remain in exile for their own safety (Freedom House, 2020a).  
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India 
Climate change  
Climate change effects 
India faces numerous climate-related hazards. It is predicted to experience a 1.2-2.5 degree 
rise in temperature by 2050, increased flooding from sea-level rise and extreme precipitation 
events, and increased severity of drought and heatwaves (USAID, 2017b: 1). These are 
likely to have severe impacts (USAID, 2017b: 1-3): 
▪ Agriculture – degradation of agricultural lands leading to reduced grain yields and 
milk production, and saltwater inundation and intrusion. Projections suggest this 
could lead to a 1.8% loss of GDP by 2050.  
▪ Water – reduced water quality, increased water stress and increased flood risk. 
India’s most important river systems (Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra) are fed by 
Himalayan glaciers, which are under threat from increased temperatures, severely 
impacting water availability for agricultural, domestic and industrial use. An estimated 
12.6 million people live directly on land that is at risk from sea-level rise and nearly 
171 million people depend on coastal ecosystems vulnerable to sea-level rise, 
cyclones and storm surges. 
▪ Human health – increased heatwave- and heat stress-related mortality and morbidity, 
and diminished food security. 
▪ Ecosystems – loss of biodiversity and increased coastal and forest degradation. Any 
change in forest cover, for example, would impact the 275 million people, including 
many indigenous communities, who are directly dependent on forests for their 
livelihoods. 
Rural areas of India will be particularly affected: around 67% of the country’s population and 
80% of its poor live in rural areas; the agricultural sector employs some 60% of India’s 
population (IMCCS, 2020: 14). Climate-sensitive rain-fed agriculture accounts for 60% of 
cultivated areas and 40% of national production (USAID, 2017b: 3). 
Exacerbation of existing tensions/conflict 
The IMCCS report (2020: 14) identifies three pathways by which climate change-induced 
threats to livelihoods and food insecurity in India could translate into violence:  
▪ Lowered opportunity costs of joining rebel groups (including India’s Maoist 
insurgency), 
▪ increased opportunities for recruitment, 
▪ accentuated and more widespread social grievances.  
Instability and fragility related to economic and food security challenges can, in turn, 
decrease state capacities to address the underlying causes of these stressors, further 
increasing vulnerability and the risk of violence (IMCCS, 2020). 
The effects and risks posed by climate change to India come on top of the many internal and 
international security challenges the country already faces, including sub-national 
insurgencies, ethnic, caste-based and communal conflict, and long-standing hostility with 
Pakistan as well as tension with China. These existing security challenges could be 
aggravated by the impacts of climate change. Inter-state population flows (conflict-induced 
migration) could manifest as ethnic or sectarian conflict. Security dynamics in some of 
India’s most unstable regions intersect with climate-sensitive issues around water sharing 
14 
and disaster risk and response. The IMCCS report (2020: 15-16) gives examples from 
around the country of how climate change effects could potentially fuel conflict:  
▪ Urban areas – Urban violence in India has hitherto mainly taken the form of ethnic 
riots and violent protests, but climate-related events such as natural disasters, food 
price hikes or increased heat could drive greater urban violence in the future, 
including violence between religious and ethnic communities. 
▪ Northeast – High climate vulnerability in Bangladesh could drive migration into 
neighbouring Indian states (Indian law grants citizenship to Bangladeshi Hindus). 
This could exacerbate tensions in northeast India and across the country given 
existing anti-migrant politics in those states, including from indigenous communities 
whose separatist movements are concerned over such a population influx. These 
dynamics could in turn deepen the alienation of minority populations across India. 
▪ Kashmir – Climate change could drive increasing violence in the India-Pakistan 
standoff over Kashmir, which will see more floods, avalanches and other disasters as 
climate change increases glacier melt, extreme rainfall events and volatile river flows. 
Inadequate disaster response could deepen the Kashmiri population’s alienation and 
resentment toward the Indian state, as was the case after major floods in 2014, when 
local residents alleged neglect by the Indian military forces responsible for relief 
efforts. 
▪ Assam – Assam state in the Brahmaputra river basin, which is likely to experience 
more climate-related flooding, has experienced major protests in response to the 
December 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act (giving Bangladeshi Hindus Indian 
citizenship). Although its separatist movement has waned, support for this cause – 
combined with tensions with the central government - may increase in the context of 
more frequent and severe flooding and disasters. 
▪ Interstate water disputes – Interstate disputes over river water sharing could also be 
accentuated under climate change, potentially leading to the kinds of violence, 
protests and riots seen in the Cauvery river dispute (over water sharing between 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu), or contestations such as those over the Sutlej and Beas 
river waters that were a factor in Punjab’s Sikh insurgency in the 1980s. 
▪ Pakistan and China – Both India and Pakistan are dependent – the latter almost 
totally – on the Indus River system. There are already significant tensions over Indus 
waters due to factors such as dam construction by India and China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative, which includes dams in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa. Climate impacts in the Himalayas and Indus river basin could worsen 
the tense India-Pakistan relationship, further stressing the Indus Water Treaty (which 
governs sharing of waters between the two countries) and necessitating dam designs 
that could lead to bad-faith actions, misunderstandings or manipulation of 
perceptions, e.g., around fears that India may intentionally release floodwaters or 
Pakistan may accuse India of this in the context of climate-driven flooding. 
The above list highlights some key climate change-conflict hotspots and is by no means 
comprehensive, but it provides an indication of the scale of the climate change-security 
challenges facing India. Given existing tensions in South Asia and India’s growing 
significance as a regional security actor, the IMCCS (2020: 16) warn: ‘how successfully India 
manages climate-related challenges, and the impact they have on its domestic stability and 
national politics, will have a bearing on security not only in South Asia, but across the Indo-
Asia Pacific and globally’. 
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Guarding civic space and including all voices  
Freedom of expression and media freedom 
The Indian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression but allows 
the Government to limit these in a number of situations, including in the interests of the 
sovereignty, integrity and security of the state, public order, and in relation to incitement to 
an offence (Kamdar, 2018). There are also several sections of the Penal Code that 
criminalise certain speech, e.g., Section 292 criminalises obscenity. The Government has 
used these various provisions to ban books and films, e.g. The Satanic Verses by Salman 
Rushdie, and India’s Daughter, a 2015 documentary about the gang rape of a Delhi college 
student (Kamdar, 2018). In 2014, an RSS3 member was able to force Penguin India to 
withdraw a book about Hindus and pulp all copies in its possession, by bringing a series of 
civil and criminal actions against the book on the basis that it violated Section 295a of the 
Penal Code, which criminalises anything that ‘outrages religious feelings of any class’ of 
citizens (Kamdar, 2018).  
Charges of sedition and defamation are also used in India to curb free speech and to 
intimidate government critics. A folk singer, students cheering at a cricket game, and the 
author Arundhati Roy are just some who have been charged with sedition (Kamdar, 2018). 
In October 2019, police in Bihar state filed a case of sedition against 49 people including 
well-known movie personalities, for writing an open letter to Prime Minister Modi expressing 
concerns over hate crimes and mob violence targeting minority communities (HRW, 2020b). 
The case was closed after widespread condemnation. Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian 
Penal Code criminalise defamation in terms so broad anyone can claim to be aggrieved by 
something said or written about them. ‘This includes powerful Indian corporations, which do 
not hesitate to sue authors, journalists, or activists for defamation, backed up with claims for 
damages no author, publishing house, newspaper, or non-profit group can afford to pay’ 
(Kamdar, 2018). As well as the threat of colossal punitive damages, filing a defamation suit 
against someone is a sure way to tie the person up with legal fees and court proceedings, 
potentially for years (Kamdar, 2018).  
Physical intimidation can also prevent freedom of expression and speech. As Kamdar (2018) 
reports: 
In January 2015, celebrated Tamil author Perumal Murugan ‘declared literary suicide 
after being hounded by local chapters of right-wing Hindu groups affiliated with the 
ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the RSS that found passages in his 
novel One Part Woman offensive. After copies of his book were burnt by an angry 
mob and he’d received threatening phone calls, Murugan met with local authorities 
and agreed to apologize and withdraw copies of his book from sale’. 
India’s ranking in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index was 142 (out of 180 countries), two 
places down from its 2019 ranking (RSF, 2020b). While no journalists were murdered in 
2019 (compared to six in 2018), ‘there have been constant press freedom violations, 
including police violence against journalists, ambushes by political activists, and reprisals 
instigated by criminal groups or corrupt local officials’ (RSF, 2020b). According to Reporters 
without Borders, since the overwhelming election victory of the BJP in spring 2019, pressure 
on the media to toe the Government’s Hindu nationalist line has increased (RSF, 2020b):  
 
3 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist paramilitary organisation. 
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Those who espouse Hindutva, the ideology that gave rise to Hindu nationalism, are 
trying to purge all manifestations of “anti-national” thought from the national debate. 
The coordinated hate campaigns waged on social networks against journalists who 
dare to speak or write about subjects that annoy Hindutva followers are alarming and 
include calls for the journalists concerned to be murdered. The campaigns are 
particularly virulent when the targets are women.  
As with freedom of expression, charges of sedition and defamation, undermining security 
and contempt-of-court charges are used to curb media freedom (Freedom House, 2020b). In 
addition, ‘journalists risk harassment, death threats, and physical violence in the course of 
their work. Such attacks are rarely punished, and some have taken place with the complicity 
or active participation of police’ (Freedom House, 2020b). This has contributed to self-
censorship on the part of the media. Press freedom is also undermined by close 
relationships between politicians, business executives and lobbyists, on the one hand, and 
leading media personalities and owners of media outlets, on the other (Freedom House, 
2020b).  
Freedom of expression and media freedom were totally curbed in Indian Administered 
Kashmir, following the Modi government’s decision to rescind the state’s autonomy (see 
below). Fixed-line and mobile internet connections were completely shut down for several 
months, ‘making it virtually impossible for journalists to cover what was happening in what 
has become a vast open prison’ (RSF, 2020b). [Slow speed 2G internet was restored after 
seven months.4] 
Freedom of belief 
The Constitution also guarantees freedom of religion, and India is officially a secular 
democracy, but the rise of Hindu nationalism has prompted religiously motivated attacks 
against religious minorities – especially since the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 
2014 (Freedom House, 2020b).  
Legislation in several states (including Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujrat, 
Arunachal Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh) criminalises religious conversions that take 
place as a result of ‘force’ or ‘allurement’; some states require government permission for 
conversion (Ochab, 2019; Freedom House, 2020b). Ochab (2019) notes that ‘while 
conversions from Hinduism to other minority religions have been closely enforced with the 
threat of such conversions triggering criminal charges, conversion (including forced 
conversions) of non-Hindus to Hinduism continue to be practised with relative impunity’. 
According to the USCIRF (as cited in Ochab, 2019), ‘These ceremonies are based on the 
view that all individuals born in India are Hindus by default, even if their communities have 
practised other faiths for several generations’. 
Trading or killing cows for meat has become a particularly sensitive issue, with mob violence 
carried out against minorities – notably Muslims – by extremist Hindu groups affiliated with 
the ruling BJP. Between May 2015 and 2019, 50 people were killed and over 250 injured in 
such attacks (HRW, 2020b). ‘Muslims were also beaten and forced to chant Hindu slogans’ 
(HRW, 2020b). According to Freedom House (2020b) more than 120 cases of cow-related 
violence, including lynchings, have been reported since Modi came to power. The ruling BJP 





‘Police failed to properly investigate the crimes, stalled investigations, ignored procedures, 
and filed criminal cases against witnesses to harass and intimidate them’ (HRW, 2020b). In 
August 2019, a Rajasthan court acquitted six suspects in the 2017 killing of a Muslim man, 
despite eyewitness accounts and video evidence of their complicity; the victim was 
posthumously charged with cow smuggling, though that case was dropped (Freedom House, 
2020b).  
There has also been a rise in other religiously motivated attacks, predominantly against 
religious minorities, notably Muslims. In 2017 alone, 111 people were killed and 2,384 
injured in communal clashes (Ochab, 2019). Amnesty International (2019a) reports scores of 
hate crimes against Muslims and other religious groups, as well as others (e.g., caste-based 
crimes) taking place across the country, many carried out by vigilante groups and mobs. 
Moreover, ‘the level of violence is expected to increase as perpetrators continue to enjoy 
impunity for their crimes’ (Ochab, 2019). The Delhi police were accused of turning a blind 
eye to mobs who attacked Muslim neighbourhoods in February this year (AFP in 
Washington, 2020). In November 2019, the Supreme Court reached a long-awaited verdict 
in a case concerning a disputed religious site (Babri Mosque-Ayodhya Temple) in the state 
of Uttar Pradesh. While the judgment offered some accommodations to the minority Muslim 
community after finding that land for a mosque should be set aside elsewhere, it allowed 
construction of a Hindu temple to proceed at the site in question, where a mosque had stood 
for centuries until it was destroyed by Hindu extremists in 1992 (Freedom House, 2020b). 
Earlier this year, the USCIRF issued its annual report condemning India’s record on religious 
freedom: ‘In 2019 religious freedom conditions in India experienced a drastic turn downward, 
with religious minorities under increasing assault’ (cited in AFP in Washington, 2020). The 
Commission found that Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist government ‘allowed violence 
against minorities and their houses of worship to continue with impunity, and also engaged 
in and tolerated hate speech and incitement to violence’ (cited in AFP in Washington, 2020). 
It pointed to comments by the Home Minister Amit Shah, who referred to mostly Muslim 
migrants as ‘termites’, and to a citizenship law that effectively rendered many Indian Muslims 
stateless (see below) as well as the repeal of autonomy in Indian-Administered Kashmir 
(AFP in Washington, 2020). The USCIRF called for India to be added to the list of ‘countries 
of particular concern’ (nine others on the list include Iran, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar and 
Pakistan) that would be subject to sanctions if they did not improve their record (AFP in 
Washington, 2020).  
Civil society freedom and under-represented groups 
Freedom House (2020b) note that a wide variety of NGOs operate in India, ‘but some 
continue to face threats, legal harassment, excessive police force and occasionally lethal 
violence’. The Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA) has been used to restrict the 
functioning of certain groups, in particular those advocating human rights (HRW, 2020b). 
The FCRA allows the federal government to deny NGOs access to foreign funding: since 
2015, nearly 15,000 associations have been deregistered under the FCRA (Freedom House, 
2020b). In 2018, the offices of Greenpeace India and Amnesty International India were 
raided by government financial crimes units and their accounts were frozen (Freedom 
House, 2020b). In 2019, Amnesty International India was served with a ‘show cause’ notice 
for alleged violations of India’s foreign exchange law, and in November that year the 
organisation’s offices were raided by the Central Bureau of Investigation. Amnesty also 
reported being the target of an online smear campaign that some pro-government media 
outlets took part in (Freedom House, 2020b).  
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Another legal tool used by the Government is the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 
(UAPA) - a counterterrorism law. Rights groups are concerned about how the UAPA 
infringes on due process rights and has been misused to target religious minorities, critics of 
the Government and social activists (HRW, 2020b). In 2018, nine prominent human rights 
activists were imprisoned under the UAPA, accused of being members of a banned Maoist 
organisation and of inciting violent protests (HRW, 2020b). In the same case, in September 
2019, a raid was conducted on the home of a Delhi University professor, who has been 
vocal on the rights of persons with disabilities and against caste discrimination (HRW, 
2020b). 
The position of Scheduled Castes (Dalits) and Scheduled Tribes in India remains difficult. 
The Constitution bars discrimination on the basis of caste, and laws set aside quotas in 
education and government jobs for historically underprivileged groups. Despite this, 
‘members of these castes and minorities face routine discrimination and violence, and the 
criminal justice system fails to provide equal protection to all marginalized groups’ (Freedom 
House, 2020b). In parts of the country, especially rural areas, informal community councils 
issue edicts concerning social customs: these decisions can result in violence or persecution 
aimed at those perceived to have transgressed social norms, especially members of the 
scheduled castes (Freedom House, 2020b). In September 2019, the Supreme Court issued 
notices to authorities to examine caste-based exclusion at universities across India following 
a petition filed by mothers of two students – one a Dalit and the other from a tribal 
community – who committed suicide allegedly due to discrimination (HRW, 2020b). In 
February 2019, nearly 2 million people from tribal communities and forest-dwellers were 
placed at risk of forced displacement and loss of livelihoods after the Supreme Court ruled to 
evict all those who had claims rejected under the Forest Rights Act (HRW, 2020b). 
While all minority groups in India face discrimination, it is Muslims who have been most 
marginalised under the Modi government. Two recent developments are particularly 
significant. In August 2019, the Assam government published a National Register of Citizens 
aimed at identifying Indian citizens and regular migrants following repeated protests and 
violence over irregular migration of ethnic Bengalis from Bangladesh (HRW, 2020b). The list 
excluded two million people, mostly Muslims, many of whom had lived in India for years, 
sometimes their entire lifetimes – the exclusion effectively rendered them stateless 
(Freedom House, 2020b; HRW, 2020b). ‘Those excluded had allegedly failed to produce 
documentation that they or their ancestors resided in India before neighbouring Bangladesh 
became independent in 1971’ (Freedom House, 2020b). In September 2019, India’s Home 
Minister declared that the National Register of Citizens would be implemented across the 
country (HRW, 2020b).  
In December 2019, the Indian parliament passed the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 
amending the Citizenship Act to enable irregular migrants to acquire Indian citizenship 
through naturalisation and registration. However, it restricts the eligibility to only Hindus, 
Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan 
who entered India on or before 31 December 2014 – Muslims are excluded (Amnesty 
International, 2019a). Freedom House (2020b) described it as a ‘plainly discriminatory law 
…to ensure citizenship for Bengali Hindus who were left stateless by the Assam register’.  
The second significant development in relation to Muslims in India was the Government’s 
sudden move, on 5 August 2019, to revoke the special autonomy of the country’s only 
Muslim-majority state, Kashmir. Prior to doing so, in the first few days of August, the 
Government imposed a security lockdown in the state and deployed large numbers of 
19 
additional troops. ‘Thousands of Kashmiris were detained without charge, including former 
chief ministers, political leaders, opposition activists, lawyers and journalists. The internet 
and phones were shut down’ (HRW, 2020b). While the Government claimed the measures 
were necessary to prevent loss of life, Human Rights Watch reported there were serious 
allegations of beatings and torture by security forces (HRW, 2020b). Some restrictions were 
lifted in November 2019, but hundreds remained in detention, mobile phone services and 
internet access were still limited, and opposition politicians, foreign diplomats and 
international journalists were blocked from making independent visits to Kashmir (HRW, 
2020b).  
One effect of the removal of Kashmir’s special status is that non-Kashmiris will be able to 
buy property there, furthering what many see as the BJP’s goal of changing the Muslim-
majority demography of the state (AFP in Washington, 2020). The Government is also 
moving to break it into two smaller territories - Jammu and Kashmir - with a state legislature, 
and Buddhist-majority Ladakh which will be federally administered. There are fears that the 
erosion of Kashmiri autonomy will lead to a rise in radicalisation, as well as an influx of 
foreign militants (AFP in Washington, 2020).   
Finally, the situation also remains difficult for LGBT+ people in India. Despite a Supreme 
Court ruling in 2018 that the use of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code to ban same-sex 
sexual intercourse was unconstitutional, discrimination continues against LGBT+ people, 
including violence and harassment in some cases (Freedom House, 2020b). In June 2019, a 
criminal case was filed against Lawyers Collective, a group that provides legal aid, 
advocates for the rights of marginalised groups, and campaigns to end discrimination 
against LGBT+ people (HRW, 2020b). In November, the authorities sought the court’s 
permission to arrest the organisation’s founders for custodial interrogation despite their 
cooperation in the investigation (HRW, 2020b).  
Indonesia 
Climate change  
Climate change effects 
Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic state, consisting of more than 17,500 islands 
with over 81,000km of coastline. It is the world’s fourth most populous country: 42 million 
people live on low-lying land less than 10m above sea level (USAID, 2017c: 1). Indonesia is 
highly vulnerable to sea-level rise: a 1m rise in sea levels could inundate 4,050m² of coastal 
land and cause low-lying islands to disappear (Dunne, 2019). Indeed, 2,000 of the country’s 
smaller islands are projected to be submerged by 2050, and 5.9 million people are estimated 
to be affected by coastal flooding each year by 2100 (USAID, 2017c: 1). Indonesia is also 
vulnerable to other climate change-related disasters, notably forest and land fires, 
landslides, storms and drought.  
Key climate change impacts in Indonesia include (USAID, 2017c: 1-3; MoFA, 2018):  
▪ Agriculture and food security – Reduced rice productivity, increased damage to crops 
from flooding, drought and salinisation. Agriculture accounts for nearly 14% of GDP 
and the livelihoods of 42% of the working population, including more than half of poor 
households. Rice, a crop which is particularly sensitive to changes in temperature, is 
the staple food accounting for half of the calories consumed nationally. 
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▪ Water resources – Reduced water supplies, decreased water quality, increased 
salinisation of coastal aquifers. In 2015, the Government declared 20 of the country’s 
34 provinces under severe drought. 
▪ Human health – Increased mortalities and displacement from floods and landslides, 
increased incidence of vector- and waterborne diseases. Heat-related mortality, for 
example, is expected to increase from less than 1 per 100,000 to up to 25 per 
100,000 by 2050. 
▪ Coasts and fisheries – Reefs and mangroves destroyed/damaged, increased erosion 
of coastlines, decreased marine fish populations.  
▪ Forests and biodiversity – Increased risk of forest fires, new or expanded range of 
pests, loss of habitat for endemic and/or endangered species. In 2015, forest fires 
cost the country more than USD16 billion in losses. 
Indonesia’s megacities are particularly vulnerable to flash flooding, which can trigger 
devastating landslides. Jakarta, the capital, home to 10 million people and one of the most 
densely populated cities in the world, is also one of the most threatened due to 
environmental instability (Van der Vuurst & Escobar, 2020: 1) – in particular sea-level rise. It 
has been described as the ‘fastest sinking city’ on Earth (Dunne, 2019; Henschke & Utama, 
n.d.). Parts of the city have sunk by 4m since levelling surveys began in 1978; the sinking 
makes it more vulnerable to flooding, tsunamis and intense coastal storms (Van der Vuurst & 
Escobar, 2020: 2). Such is the scale of the threat facing Jakarta that the Indonesian 
government has announced it will be relocating the country’s capital to the island of Borneo 
(Henschke & Utama, n.d.). However, the move could lead to further deforestation and loss of 
vital biodiversity there.  
Indonesia is vulnerable to climate change due to its high population density – especially in 
coastal areas, and strong dependence on natural resources for income generation and 
consumption (MoFA, 2018: 6). Deforestation has been happening on a massive scale, with 
land cleared and peats drained for palm oil production: from 2000-2015 the country lost an 
average of 498,000 hectares of forest each year (Dunne, 2019). Deforestation is a major 
driver of greenhouse gas emissions: Indonesia was the fourth highest emitter of greenhouse 
gases in 2015 (Dunne, 2019). The Asian Development Bank estimates that by 2100, the 
impacts of climate change will cost between 2.5-7% of GDP, and the poorest will bear the 
brunt of this burden5. 
Exacerbation of existing tensions/conflict 
There are currently no major violent conflicts in Indonesia: the only current armed challenges 
to the authority of the state come from a low-level separatist movement in Papua and radical 
Islamist militants, but in both cases violence is confined to sporadic attacks (Asia 
Foundation, 2017: 89). Nonetheless, there are a number of forms of low-level violence such 
as electoral and political violence, local violence over resources and community rights, urban 
crime and violence, and domestic and gender-based violence (Asia Foundation, 2017).  
Papua was integrated into Indonesia in 1969 and has seen a low intensity but sustained 
armed insurrection ever since. Key sources of grievance - in addition to the original 
plebiscite for accession to Indonesia which Papuans see as illegitimate - include ‘a sense of 
marginalization and disenfranchisement of indigenous Papuans, the perception that the 
exploitation of Papua’s natural resources does not benefit locals, and the presence and poor 




by the latter have been characterised by large-scale human rights violations, with hundreds 
of thousands of deaths and displaced people.  
Clashes over land in Indonesia ‘typically pit local communities against agribusiness 
companies or extractive industries granted concessions by the state, but they also map onto 
communal lines of opposition between different ethnic groups, or between indigenous 
populations and migrants’ (Asia Foundation, 2017: 76). The security forces in Indonesia 
have been largely successful in dismantling Islamist terrorist cells, but extremist groups in 
the country retain strong links with transnational groups. In 2015, 500 Indonesians were 
fighting with the Islamic State in Irag and Syria (ISIS) with a special military unit, Katibah 
Nusantara, established for Malay Indonesian speakers (Asia Foundation, 2017: 70). There 
are worries that returned fighters could lead to bigger and better organised Islamist attacks 
at home in future (Asia Foundation, 2017).  
Unlike other countries, the literature on Indonesia does not specifically identify ways in which 
climate change effects could exacerbate the above sources of conflict. However, given that 
clashes over land and natural resources are already a factor in low-level local violence, 
climate change effects – with loss of land and displaced people – can be expected to 
intensify such clashes. Similarly, climate change effects could lead to further in-migration in 
Papua and exploitation of local resources by outsiders – factors which are already drivers of 
the Papua insurgency. 
One study looked specifically at the links between climate change, rice production and 
violent incidents in Indonesia over a 20-year period from 1993 to 2003 (Caruso et al, 2016). 
Rice was chosen because it is a staple food in both rural and urban areas of the country, 
and a source of income for a substantial proportion of households (average 46% of 
employment in agriculture between 1994 and 2003 – Caruso et al, 2016). The study looked 
at the links between climate change and violence via rice production in 14 provinces. Robust 
evidence found a close relationship between the increase in minimum temperature reached 
during the rice-growing season (which negatively affected rice production and per capita rice 
availability) and an increase in violence (Caruso et al, 2016). In the context of climate 
change and conflict, it is also worth noting that illegal logging and deforestation fuels both 
(Blondel, 2012).  
Guarding civic space and including all voices  
Freedom of expression and media freedom 
According to Freedom House (2020c), laws against blasphemy, defamation, and certain 
other forms of speech can be used to inhibit freedom of expression in Indonesia, particularly 
on sensitive topics such as criticism of the Government and the President. The Electronic 
Information and Transactions (ITE) Law is frequently used in this regard. Amnesty 
International (2019b) found that 203 criminal investigations were initiated between October 
2014 and March 2019 against those who expressed criticism of public officials, their 
spouses, or government institutions through electronic media, social media platforms, or 
during protests – based on charges of defamation, ‘hoax dissemination’ and ‘incitement of 
enmity’, all provisions under the ITE law. In September 2019, human rights lawyer Veronica 
Koman was charged with ‘inciting hatred’ for posts on social media relating to unrest in 
Papua (Hamid, 2019). 
Authorities also use the Criminal Code and its makar (‘rebellion’) provisions, which 
criminalise acts – whether violent or not – committed with the intent to make part or all of 
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Indonesia fall into the hands of the enemy or to secede; harm the President or Vice 
President; or overthrow the Government (Amnesty International, 2019b). Peaceful pro-
independence activists in Papua and Maluku were among those arrested, prosecuted and 
imprisoned using makar charges (Amnesty International, 2019b).  
Hamid (2019) points to the increasingly prominent role of the police and their abuse of 
authority in defending governmental institutions, including the President. He cites data from 
Amnesty International that 241 individuals were criminalised for criticising authority figures of 
the Joko Widodo administration during the first term of his presidency (2014-19), including 
82 cases involving people considered to have uttered ‘hate speech’ and ‘insults’ towards the 
President (Hamid, 2019). Moreover, 65 of the 82 cases involved social media – brought to 
light largely through police monitoring of cyber activities (Hamid, 2019).  
According to Freedom House (2020c), civil servants are subject to stringent restrictions on 
online activity. In November 2019, the Government formed a task force to review ‘radical’ 
social media comments from civil servants, including speech believed to insult or criticise the 
official Pancasila ideology, the state motto, the constitution, or the Government. Civil 
servants are also prohibited from joining organisations deemed to insult the country’s 
governing principles. 
Media freedom in Indonesia is similarly hampered through legal and regulatory restrictions 
(Freedom House, 2020c). The 2008 ITE Law extended libel to online media, criminalising 
the distribution or accessibility of information or documents that are ‘contrary to the moral 
norms of Indonesia’ or involve gambling, blackmail, or defamation (Freedom House, 2020c). 
Journalists covering sensitive subjects face harassment and threats, and sometimes also 
physical assault and violence – which in many cases goes unpunished (Humanists 
International, 2020b). In May 2019, at least seven journalists were assaulted by police and 
by demonstrators while covering a post-election protest in Jakarta that turned violent 
(Freedom House, 2020c). Another tool used by the authorities is cutting internet access 
(RSF, 2020c; Freedom House, 2020c).  
Media reporting has been especially restricted in the provinces of Papua and West Papua, 
which have seen increasing unrest. Foreign journalists are not allowed to travel to the two 
provinces without special permission (Humanists International, 2020b). Violence against 
local journalists has grown, while ‘foreign journalists and local fixers are liable to be arrested 
and prosecuted, both those who try to document the Indonesian military’s abuses and those 
who just cover humanitarian issues’ (RSF, 2020c). In late August 2019, the Government 
slowed internet speeds in Papua as major protests took place, limiting journalists’ ability to 
report on events in the region (RSF, 2020c; Freedom House, 2020c). According to Reporters 
without Borders (RSF, 2020c), religious groups also threaten media freedom and many 
journalists say they censor themselves because of the threat from anti-blasphemy 
legislation.  
Freedom of belief 
Indonesia officially recognises six major religions (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, 
Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism), but does not accept atheism. Those leaving the 
‘religion’ section on their identity card blank, or adherents of unrecognised faiths, often face 
discrimination (Freedom House, 2020c). There is persistent violence against Ahmedi and 
Shia communities, and, according to Freedom House (2020c), ‘the central government 
continues to tolerate persecution of these groups’. National and local governments not only 
fail to protect religious minorities but exhibit bias in investigations and prosecutions 
(Freedom House, 2020c).  
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Religious minorities face significant obstacles in setting up places of worship. A permit 
requires the signatures of 90 congregation members and 60 local residents of different 
faiths, as well as the approval of the local Interfaith Communication Forum (Harsono, 2020). 
Given that Indonesia is 88% Muslim, these forums are overwhelmingly Muslim majority, and 
are able to exert veto power over minority groups. Not only does this make it very difficult for 
the latter to establish new churches, temples, etc., but the 2006 regulation has also been 
used to shut down hundreds of churches as well as Ahmedi and Shiite mosques and shrines 
of local ethnic religions (Harsono, 2020). 
Indonesia has anti-blasphemy legislation penalising those who ‘distort’ or ‘misrepresent’ 
recognised faiths. Humanists International (2020b) reports that there were 88 cases of 
blasphemy between 1988 and 2017. In 2016 a Buddhist woman was convicted and 
sentenced to one and a half years in jail for complaining about the decibel level of a call-to-
prayer (azan) at a mosque (HRW, 2020c). Following her complaint, mobs burned and 
ransacked at least 14 Buddhist temples, and as of October 2019 she was still in jail 
(Humanists International, 2020b: 4). Moreover, the Government is seeking to expand the 
scope of anti-blasphemy legislation to include, for example, the offence of ‘persuading 
someone to be a non-believer’ (HRW, 2020c; Humanists International, 2020b). 
Civil society freedom and under-represented groups 
NGOs in Indonesia are subject to government monitoring and interference (Freedom House, 
2020c). A 2013 law requires all NGOs to register with the Government and submit to regular 
reviews of their activities. It also limits the type of activities they can undertake – they are 
barred from committing blasphemy or espousing ideas (e.g., atheism, communism) that 
conflict with the official Pancasila ideology (Freedom House, 2020c). Moreover, the 
Government can dissolve non-compliant NGOs without judicial oversight. 
Marginalised ethnic groups include Papuans and, to a lesser extent, ethnic Chinese. 
Papuans face racial discrimination from both the wider public and the authorities (Freedom 
House, 2020c). In August 2019, police officers were filmed using racial slurs as they arrested 
a group of 43 Papuan students (Freedom House, 2020c). Papuan activists and supporters of 
the region’s separatist movement are watched and frequently detained by the authorities. 
Ethnic Chinese make up approximately 1% of the population. Despite reputedly holding 
much of the country’s wealth, they are still vulnerable to harassment (Freedom House, 
2020c). 
LGBT+ people in Indonesia suffer from widespread discrimination. Humanists International 
(2020b) reports that, ‘LGBTQ+ rights in Indonesia are increasingly maligned both in society 
and by the Government despite there being no law against sexual minorities as such. An 
intensification of Islamist demands drives growing intolerance of LGBTQ+ rights’. Nahdlatul 
Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation, has called for LGBT+ activism to be 
criminalised; this has driven activists underground and hampered groups seeking to provide 
services to LGBT+ people (Freedom House, 2020c). The authorities also target LGBT+ 
people with inflammatory and discriminatory rhetoric. 
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The Philippines 
Climate change  
Climate change effects 
The Philippines ranks second in the Global Climate Risk Index 2020 of the countries most 
affected by extreme weather events in 2018 and fourth on the countries most affected by 
climate change from 1999 to 2018 (Germanwatch, 2020: 6). This is due in large part to 
geography: the Philippines is located in the western Pacific Ocean, surrounded by naturally 
warm waters, and is comprised of over 7,000 islands, many low-lying and lacking natural 
barriers to the sea. It is in the world’s most cyclone-prone region, averaging 19–20 cyclones 
each year, of which 7–9 make landfall (USAID, 2017a: 1). Climate change effects to which 
the country is highly vulnerable include sea-level rise, increased frequency and intensity of 
extreme weather events, rising temperatures and extreme rainfall (USAID, 2017a: 1). Sea 
levels in the Philippines are rising faster than the global average, increasing the hazard 
posed by storm surges and threatening permanent inundation of low-lying areas (USAID, 
2017a: 1). 
The impacts of these climate change effects are wide-ranging and significant (USAID, 
2017a: 1): 
▪ Agriculture – Crop loss/failure, soil erosion, increased pest infestations, rising food 
prices and food imports. From 2006–2013, the Philippines was struck by 75 disasters 
– mostly cyclones, tropical storms and floods – that caused USD3.8 billion in 
accumulated damage and losses to the agriculture sector. An estimated annual GDP 
loss of up to 2.2% is projected by 2100 due to climate impacts on agriculture. 
▪ Water – Water shortages, degraded water quality, increased flood and landslide risk, 
▪ Energy – Reduced energy production potential, increased demand for energy 
services. For example, hydropower production, which contributes 20% to the 
country’s energy supply, is vulnerable to reduced water availability from climate 
change. 
▪ Coastal ecosystems – Loss of coastal defence, marine habitat and biodiversity, 
reduced fish populations. More than 60% of the coastal population’s livelihoods 
depend on marine resources, and coral reefs and mangroves are valued at USD2 
billion and USD83 million per year, respectively, for their contributions to fishing, 
tourism and storm protection. 
▪ Infrastructure/services – Damage to roads, bridges, and water and sanitation 
facilities. Rising sea levels threaten infrastructure and settlements in 25 cities located 
along the coastline. 
▪ Human health – Loss of life and livelihoods, increased risk of vector-/waterborne 
disease (e.g., diarrhoea, dengue, malaria) and population displacement. Increases in 
malaria and dengue in the Philippines are positively correlated with changes in 
temperature. 
The urban poor, many of whom live in temporary shelters, are most at risk, lacking the 
resources to prevent or mitigate the threat of coastal inundation and storm surge. The 
largest metropolitan area in the Philippines is Quezon City (Metro Manila) with approximately 
2.9 million inhabitants (IMCCS, 2020: 34). Quezon City is particularly vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change, with the most pertinent challenge being the frequency and 
intensity of tropical storms, including excessive rainfall, cyclones, and typhoons, that lead to 
coastal floods (IMCCS, 2020: 34). The impact of these security risks is exacerbated by 
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urbanisation, population density, and the fact that poverty and inequality remain significant 
challenges in the Philippines. The IMCCS (2020: 34) notes that in rural and coastal 
municipalities, natural hazards often have destructive socio-economic effects that cause a 
continuous cycle of poverty and inequity.  
Exacerbation of existing tensions/conflict 
Conflict has been a longstanding feature of the Philippines, with two long-running 
insurgencies – by a number of Moro nationalist/separatist groups in Mindanao and the Sulu 
Archipelago, and by the communist New People’s Army (nationwide, but recently mainly in 
western Mindanao) – and a number of other types of conflict and violence. The latter include 
violent extremist groups such as Abu-Sayyaf, anti-drug violence by state actors and 
vigilantes, electoral violence, and local conflicts over resources and community rights 
(Herbert, 2019b). Both Central and Western Mindanao are Muslim-majority areas in the 
southern part of the Philippines; over 150,000 people are estimated to have been killed there 
in the past five decades (Barron, Engvall & Morell, 2016, as cited in Herbert, 2019b: 5).   
Drivers of conflict in the Philippines include poverty, lack of opportunities, land dispossession 
(indigenous Muslims to Christian migrant settlers) and religious and economic 
marginalisation. The Government’s ‘heavy handed’ response to insurgencies/violent 
extremism (with widespread human rights violations) has exacerbated the situation. Also 
significant, particularly in the Mindanao/Sulu Archipelago region, are a lack of rule of law, 
governance weaknesses, clan politics, criminality, and violent extremist 
preaching/transnational links to violent extremist groups (Herbert, 2019b: 2-3).  
Climate change effects in the Philippines can be expected to exacerbate conflict. For 
example, an El Niño-caused drought led to a demonstration by at least 6,000 farmers in 
2016 where they demanded government subsidies; the violent police response killed three, 
and left hundreds injured (Asia Foundation, 2017: 151, as cited in Herbert, 2019b: 13). 
Similarly, climate change is causing drought and reduced agricultural productivity in 
Mindanao, leading to food insecurity and increased poverty in a part of the country where 
poverty levels are already high (two-fifths of the poor in the Philippines live in Mindanao – 
Herbert, 2019b: 12). This is likely to fuel anti-government sentiment in the area and drive 
support for separatist/violent extremist groups, especially among youth.  
Women are affected in different ways: ‘Women are more disadvantaged and as such tend to 
farm in smaller plots, work shorter hours or limit farming to cash crops. Extreme climate 
events in conflict-prone agrarian communities appear to subject women to forced migration, 
increased discrimination, loss of customary rights to land, resource poverty and food 
insecurity’ (Chandra, et al., 2017, as cited in Herbert, 2019b: 13).  
Guarding civic space and including all voices  
Freedom of expression and media freedom 
Freedom of expression in the Philippines is looked at alongside civil society freedom below. 
Reporters without Borders (RSF, 2020d) ranked the Philippines 134 out of 180 countries for 
press freedom in 2020, down two places from 2019. According to Freedom House (2020d) 
‘the Philippines remains one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists, and 
the President’s hostile rhetoric toward members of the media exacerbates an already 
perilous situation’. When sworn in as president in June 2016, Rodrigo Duterte warned: ‘Just 
because you’re a journalist, you are not exempted from assassination if you’re a son of a 
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bitch’ (RSF, 2020d). His government has been overt in its suppression of the media. 
Freedom House (2020d) cited a coalition of media groups reporting that:   
from June 30, 2016 to April 30, 2019, there were 128 documented attacks and 
threats against the press, including physical attacks; threats, including death threats 
and bomb threats; smearing journalists as conspiring against the Government; “red-
tagging,” or alleging that targets harbour communist sympathies or connections in 
order to increase harassment against them; and DDoS attacks on alternative-media 
sites.  
DDoS refers to distributed denial of service attacks that generate fake visits to websites and 
render them inaccessible (Amnesty International, 2019b). Amnesty International (2019b) 
cites media organisations saying at least 15 journalists had been killed in the Philippines in 
connection with their work under the Duterte administration since 2016.  
The authorities make little effort to find those responsible, or to protect journalists. Indeed, 
Freedom House (2020d) assert that ‘impunity remains the norm for violent crimes against 
activists and journalists’. In 2009, 58 people, including 32 journalists, were killed in 
Maguindanao in the southern Philippines. As of October 2020, of the 197 people charged 
with murder, 80 remained at large, 55 were acquitted and 28 were convicted of murder – this 
happened in December 2019, ten years after the massacre (Humanists International, 2020c; 
RSF, 2020d). Those at large include police officers and members of a notorious clan with 
political influence in the region (Humanists International, 2020c). 
As well as intimidation and assaults, various laws are used to target journalists. These 
include Executive Order 608 which established a National Security Clearance System to 
protect classified information, and the Human Security Act which allows journalists to be 
wiretapped based on suspicion of involvement in terrorism (Freedom House, 2020d). Libel is 
a criminal offence, and libel cases have been used frequently to quiet criticism of public 
officials (Freedom House, 2020d). Journalists are regularly charged under cyber libel laws 
which are punishable by up to eight years in prison (HRW, 2020d).  
The treatment of online news site Rappler exemplifies the Duterte government’s attitude to 
media critics. Rappler has reported extensively on killings and other human rights violations 
in Duterte’s ‘war on drugs’. In 2018, the Government revoked Rappler’s registration for 
violation of regulations that forbid foreign entities from exerting any control over domestic 
news outlets (Freedom House, 2020d). By February 2019, founder and editor-in-chief Maria 
Ressa had been arrested twice and had posted bail for 11 different charges including tax 
evasion, libel, cyber-libel and violations of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulations (Freedom House, 2020d). Amnesty International (2019b) reported that Ressa - 
along with a former Rappler reporter and board members - faced at least ten politically 
motivated lawsuits.    
The extent to which media freedom has been stifled in the Philippines is clear from a survey 
in which half of the journalists taking part agreed that ‘it is dangerous to print or broadcast 
anything critical of the administration, even if it is the truth’ (HRW, 2020d).  
Freedom of belief 
The Philippines is almost 80% Catholic, with large Muslim minorities in the south. The 
literature does not report any significant issues with regards to freedom of belief.  
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Civil society freedom and under-represented groups 
The Government has taken steps to curb civil society freedom, targeting both individual 
activists and organisations. According to Freedom House (2020d), ‘Environmental and land 
rights activists operate at a particularly acute risk. The international environmental rights 
group Global Witness reported in its most recent statistics that 30 land and environmental 
defenders were killed in the Philippines in the year 2018 alone’. Global Witness asserted that 
in 2018 the Philippines became the most dangerous country in the world for land and 
environmental activists (HRW, 2020d).  
Critics of the President and Government are also targeted. In July 2019, sedition charges 
were filed against Vice President Leni Robredo and 35 other people including priests and 
bishops, political opposition members, and human rights lawyers and activists, for allegedly 
participating in a plot to oust Duterte (HRW, 2020d). The charges are attributed by many to 
these people criticising Duterte’s war on drugs and the widespread human rights violations 
by the authorities (HRW, 2020d). Senator Leila de Lima - one of the most outspoken critics 
of Duterte’s anti-drugs war - was arrested in 2017 on charges of accepting money from drug 
dealers and was still in jail three years later; she is recognised as a prisoner of conscience 
by a number of international rights groups (Freedom House, 2020d).  
With regards to civil society groups, in November 2018 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission issued a memorandum, ostensibly to protect non-profits from money laundering 
and terrorist financing abuse, mandating them to disclose past and present funding sources, 
and specify the projects and activities funded (Freedom House, 2020d). Rights groups 
criticised the memorandum as unnecessary government intrusion. 
The Philippines is a strongly Catholic country – for example, it is the only place in the world, 
other than the Holy See, which does not allow divorce. As such, it is no surprise that LGBT+ 
people face discrimination and legal restrictions, including in employment, education and 
other services (Freedom House, 2020d). In 2017, the House of Representatives passed the 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression (SOGIE) Equality Bill, which would 
protect against discrimination on those grounds (Freedom House, 2020d). However, in 2019 
the Senate failed to pass the bill. It has also not passed legislation recognising same-sex 
partnerships and extending benefits to same-sex couples (HRW, 2020d). President Duterte 
declined to certify the SOGIE Equality Bill as urgent and the Government said it would push 
for a broader law that would cover ‘all forms’ of discrimination (Amnesty International, 
2019b).  
Thailand 
Climate change  
Climate change effects 
Thailand sits in the Mekong Delta plain and is ranked 8th in the Global Climate Risk Index 
2020 for long-term risk (covering the 20-year period from 1999 to 2018) to extreme weather 
events (German Watch, 2020: 9). Among the main climate change effects in the country are 
flooding, sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion and droughts. The current area in Thailand 
exposed to coastal flooding is projected to increase by 37% by 2100 (IMCCS, 2020: 19). 
This means 23 of its 64 beach regions could disappear under water, losing at best 46% and 
at worst 72% of their surface. This will have a devastating impact on Thailand’s tourist 
sector, which accounts for 12% of its GDP (IMCCS, 2020: 19). Other key sectors of the 
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economy which will be hit include agriculture (accounting for around 50% of employment and 
10% of GDP) and trade, while millions will be displaced (Kisner, 2008: 1). Saltwater intrusion 
has caused a significant decline in rice yields in the Upper Gulf of Thailand and contributed 
to vulnerability of mangrove forests (which act as a natural buffer to protect inland territories) 
and degraded coral reefs (Open Development Thailand, 2018). Climate change effects have 
also damaged ecosystems and livelihoods that depend on them. 
Thailand’s capital city, Bangkok, is especially vulnerable, ranking 7th in cities most exposed 
to climate change impacts (IMCCS, 2020: 19). Its mean elevation is just 1m above sea level; 
it has 20 flood-prone locations and four flood-sensitive districts (IMCCS, 2020: 35). Bangkok 
could lose 40% of its land by 2030 – indeed, new projections state that the entire city could 
be subject to coastal flooding as early as 2050 (IMCCS, 2020: 19). While significant flood 
protection projects are underway for Bangkok, including a flood protection wall, it remains 
vulnerable (IMCCS, 2020: 35). Bangkok is home to 15% of the country’s population and 
serves as the economic, political and social centre not only for Thailand, but for the greater 
Mekong region. Climate change effects in the city will therefore have devastating impacts on 
millions of people. 
Exacerbation of existing tensions/conflict 
Thailand has been facing a hot-cold armed insurgency for many decades in southern 
provinces, notably Patani as well as Narathiwat, Yala and the southernmost districts of 
Songkhla, all of which have large Malay Muslim populations. The insurgency reignited in 
2004, with some 15,000 violent incidents and 6,000 deaths (90% civilians) up to 2018 
according to one estimate (Morch, 2018). While the southern insurgency has historic roots, 
the rise of ‘extremist’ Buddhism in the country is a factor. This rise is part of a regional trend, 
also seen in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. For example, in Thailand, it is manifested in demands 
to make Buddhism Thailand’s official religion, as well as in attacks against Muslims (Hutt, 
2016). There has also been periodic political unrest for many years, including in recent 
months demonstrations against the monarchy (Chachavalpongpun & Kurlantzick, 2020).  
The literature does not refer to climate change effects potentially influencing or exacerbating 
these specific conflicts/tensions, but it does assert that deteriorating environmental 
conditions could exacerbate existing social issues such as political unrest, poor economic 
conditions, food insecurity, inequality and poverty, and cause widespread destruction of 
livelihoods. These, in turn, could trigger clashes between different communities and wider 
conflict. The IMCCS (2020: 19) warn, for example, that ‘the social and political 
consequences of the tourism loss could be devastating and politically disruptive across the 
region’. 
Guarding civic space and including all voices  
Freedom of expression and media freedom 
There are significant restrictions on freedom of expression in Thailand despite the country’s 
transition from military to semi-civilian rule in July 2019. According to Freedom House 
(2020e), ‘anyone perceived as a critic of the military or monarchy remains at high risk of 
surveillance, arrest, imprisonment, harassment and physical attack’. Various laws are used 
in this regard (Amnesty International, 2019c; Humanists International, 2020d; Freedom 
House, 2020e): 
▪ Provisions in the Criminal Code punishing sedition and defamation. 
▪ Provisions under the 2016 Computer-Related Crime Act which allow the Government 
to prosecute individuals for spreading ‘false’ or ‘distorted’ information. 
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▪ The 2019 Cybersecurity Law and Data Protection Act allowing the Government to 
increase online surveillance and censorship, without basic legal safeguards.  
▪ The Anti-Fake News Centre launched in 2019, and mandated to monitor online 
content, filter out anything deemed ‘fake news’, and take action against users who 
post such content.  
Amnesty International (2019c) reports that the above laws/measures have been used to 
target, among others, opposition politicians, academics, factory workers, and activists. It 
describes the kinds of activities they were charged for: participating in ‘activities such as 
marching in peaceful demonstrations, discussing political reform, or criticising the monarchy 
or the Government, including on social media. At least 21 people were prosecuted for 
wearing t-shirts or displaying flags associated with a movement proposing a federal political 
system’ (Amnesty International, 2019c). The Government has also pressured social media 
platforms to restrict access to content critical of the monarchy or the military (Amnesty 
International, 2019c). 
There are two further significant restrictions on freedom of expression and speech: in 
relation to the monarch, and to Buddhism. The king is traditionally revered in Thai culture as 
the protector of the country and of the Buddhist religion, and Article 112 of the Criminal Code 
(lèse-majesté) states that anyone who ‘defames, insults or threatens the King or Queen or 
the heir apparent or the regent’ will be punished with a jail term of up to 15 years’ 
(Humanists International, 2020d: 3). Since 2014 (when the military took power in a coup), at 
least 90 people have been charged under the law (Humanists International, 2020d: 3). For 
example, in August 2017, a law student and activist was sentenced to two and a half years 
imprisonment for sharing a BBC profile of the new king on Facebook (Humanists 
International, 2020d: 3). Use of Article 112 decreased after 2018, but other legal provisions 
restricting freedom of expression (see above) are being used to prosecute critics of the 
monarchy (HRW, 2020c).  
The Constitution prohibits speech likely to insult Buddhism (and other religions), while the 
Sangha Act specifically prohibits the defamation or insult of Buddhism and the Buddhist 
clergy (Humanists International, 2020d). Those found guilty of violating this law can face up 
to a year in prison or fines up to 20,000 Baht (approx. USD667) (Humanists International, 
2020d: 3). The Penal Code also has sections which prohibit the insult or disturbance of 
religious places or services of all officially recognised groups, with penalties ranging from 
imprisonment of one to seven years or a fine of 2,000 to 14,000 Baht (Humanists 
International, 2020d: 3). Given that Buddhism is the overwhelming majority religion in 
Thailand, such restrictions largely apply to that religion. 
Media freedom is curbed in Thailand using many of the legal instruments described above. 
According to Human Rights Watch (2020e), ‘Outspoken media outlets and reporters faced 
intimidation and punishment for commentaries critical of the junta’. This is echoed by 
Freedom House (2020e): ‘Under military rule, the Government systematically used 
censorship, intimidation, and legal action to suppress independent media, and international 
and domestic news media were frequently censored during the election campaign period in 
early 2019’.  
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The transition to civilian rule in July 2019 does not appear to have improved the situation – 
perhaps not surprising given that the former military ruler General Prayuth, became Prime 
Minister, Defence Minister and head of the Thai police (RSF, 2020e). In September 2019, a 
political commentator was fired from a radio station for making corruption allegations against 
the military, while in October a Belgian journalist was detained by the police and told not to 
pursue his investigative story about a string of violent attacks on pro-democracy activists 
(HRW, 2020e). In December 2019, a journalist was sentenced to two years in prison for 
tweeting about the conditions of migrant workers (RSF, 2020e). Moreover, several 
journalists charged under the military junta still face prosecution (Freedom House, 2020e). 
Reporters without Borders (RSF, 2020e) also assert that Thai authorities allow Cambodian, 
Chinese and Vietnamese operatives to come into Thailand and arrest dissident exile 
journalists or bloggers from their country in order to ‘repatriate’ and then jail them. 
Freedom of belief 
Only five religions are officially recognised by the law in Thailand: Buddhism, Islam, 
Hinduism, Sikhism and Christianity (Humanists International, 2020d). Atheism is not 
recognised, creating problems for non-religious people when accessing public services – 
they must state their religious affiliation in the requisite forms and cannot leave the section 
blank (Humanists International, 2020d). 
Civil society freedom and under-represented groups 
According to Freedom House (2020e) civil society groups ‘focused on defending human 
rights and freedom of expression, and promoting democracy, continue to face restrictions, 
criminalization and prosecution by the state, including under sedition and lѐse majesté laws’. 
Pro-democracy activists were attacked by gangs thought to be connected to the military 
following elections in March 2019 (Freedom House, 2020e). Human Rights Watch (2020c) 
notes that, ‘The government has not seriously investigated these attacks and instead told 
activists and dissidents to give up political activity if they wanted state protection’. Civil 
society groups that promote republicanism, e.g., the Organization for Thai Federation, are 
forbidden (Freedom House, 2020e).  
As in the Philippines, land rights and environmental activists in Thailand risk serious and 
even deadly violence: Global Witness described Thailand as among the most dangerous 
countries in Asia for such activists to operate (Freedom House, 2020e). In September 2019, 
skull fragments found in a national park were identified as belonging to a Karen 
environmental activist who was last seen in the park in the custody of government park 
officials in April 2014 (Freedom House, 2020e). Arrest warrants for four park officials wanted 
in connection with the abduction and murder were issued in November 2019. 
Humanists International (2020d: 2) note that the ‘attachment to traditional religious values 
translates into conservative views on gender roles and non-conformist sexualities’. With 
regards to LGBT+ rights, ‘religion negatively affects the perception of non-conformist sexual 
orientation and gender identities: Theravada Buddhism views them ‘either as a punishment 
for sins in past lives, or as a lack of ability to control sexual impulses and tendencies’ 
(Humanists International, 2020d: 2). There is widespread discrimination against LGBT+ 
people, by families and society, employers and the authorities. The situation for LGBT+ 
people is worse in southern provinces of the country with a strong Islamic population. 
However, according to Freedom House (2020e), ‘Thailand is known for its tolerance of 
LGBT+ people, though societal acceptance is higher for tourists and expatriates than for 
nationals, and unequal treatment and stigmatization remain challenges’. A draft law, the Life 
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Partners Act, would if passed, be an important step towards recognising same-sex couples 
and giving them important legal protections (HRW, 2020e). 
Also marginalised in Thailand are indigenous hill communities in the north of the country. 
These are ‘not fully integrated into society. Many lack formal citizenship, which renders them 
ineligible to vote, own land, attend state schools, or receive protection under labour laws’ 
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